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Unfolding the impacts of transaction-specific investments: Moderation by out-of-the-
channel-loop perceptions and achievement orientations 
 
Abstract 
When distribution channel partners make specific investments, tailored to a particular 
supplier, it could prompt either opportunism or beneficial (e.g., extra-role) behaviors. The 
impact of the investment in turn may depend on whether the channel partner perceives that it 
is being left out of the channel loop by the supplier, as well as that partner’s achievement 
orientation. This study considers a sample of 155 IT professional service firms and finds that 
their knowledge-intensive, transaction-specific investments (TSIs) encourage distinct 
behavioral intentions. If they perceive that the supplier is leaving them out of the channel 
loop, the effects of the TSIs get amplified in relation to opportunistic and extra-role 
behavioral intentions. Furthermore, the firms’ achievement orientation moderates these 
influences. Suppliers thus should attend closely to achievement-oriented partners to ensure 
they do not perceive that they have been left out of the channel loop.  
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1. Introduction  
In distribution channels, professional service firms (PSFs) plays an important role in moving 
products and services from suppliers to end customers. For example, Cisco generates more 
than 85% of its revenue through its channel partners, which consist of system integrators, 
managed service providers, and value-added resellers (Haranas, 2016). Beyond their direct 
impact on revenues and margins, PSFs are important sources of market intelligence, value 
cocreation, market creation, and development (Sarker, Sarker, Sahaym, & Bjorn-Andersen, 
2012). Realizing the importance of channel partners to their business, suppliers invest heavily 
in maintaining and strengthening these relationships (TSL Marketing, 2013). Similarly, 
channel partners invest time and resources tailored to a specific supplier, ranging from 
physical assets (e.g., customized machinery, tools, signs) to intangible capital (e.g., training, 
administrative procedures, skill accreditations; Brown, Crosno, & Dev, 2009). For example, 
PSFs that partner with Microsoft must complete training courses to be able to sell its products 
or services.  
Such transaction-specific investments (TSIs) by channel partners are important to 
suppliers, in that they facilitate the appropriate distribution of the supplier’s products and 
services to end customers, but they also indicate the commitment of the channel partners to 
this supply relationship. When channel partners make more TSIs, they are “locked in” to the 
relationship (Heide & Stump, 1995). This lock-in effect in turn influences channel partners’ 
behavior, in that it prevents them from doing anything that might damage the relationship, for 
fear of losing their TSIs. Furthermore, TSIs motivate channel partners to engage in behaviors 
that benefit the supplier, because the performance of a supplier to which they are closely 
attached influences their performance as well (Brown et al., 2009). In these ways, suppliers 
might use TSIs to influence and regulate channel partners’ behaviors and manage the 
relationship. Some prior studies accordingly show that TSIs reduce or mitigate channel 
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partners’ opportunistic behaviors (e.g., Handley & Benton, 2012; Ping, 1993). However, TSIs 
also might exert negative impacts, if channel partners that have invested in a relationship with 
a particular supplier seek to maximize the return on their investments by engaging in 
exploitative behaviors. The lock-in effect also causes channel partners to sense that they have 
less power or control over their relationship with the supplier, so they may seek to gain 
control and better protection for their TSIs through opportunistic acts (e.g., hiding market 
information from the supplier, cheating to earn incentives; Brown, Dev, & Lee, 2000; 
Crosno, Manolis, & Dahlstrom, 2013). These potentially mixed impacts of TSIs suggest a 
complex situation that requires further research to clarify the detailed influences on channel 
partners’ behavioral intentions. 
Recent developments in transaction cost (TC) theory suggest that elements of the channel 
relationship may influence the effect of TSIs on investors’ (as a type of channel partner) 
behaviors toward a receiver (i.e., supplier) (Crosno et al., 2013; Liu, Liu, & Li, 2014). A key 
element is a sense of exclusion in the exchange relationship (Scott, Restubog, & Zagenczyk, 
2013), and industry reports indicate that channel partners increasingly complain about being 
overlooked or excluded by suppliers that exhibit preferential treatment only of “golden-haired 
children” (Kiernan, 2014) or “elite clubs”—that is, selected channel partners that receive the 
first opportunities to offer the latest products to end-users (Gilbert, 2015). Differential 
treatment is common in any channel network, but a growing concern suggests that some 
channel partners, especially smaller firms, are becoming frustrated with such unfavorable 
treatment, relative to other players in the channel network (Wright, 2013). The impacts of 
these preferential practices have not been detailed for channel networks. 
To capture this sense or perception of being excluded from the supply chain network, we 
use the concept of out-of-the-channel-loop perceptions (OCLP). With OCLP, channel 
partners believe they are at a lower standing in the network than others, with less influence 
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and reduced access to resources or respect from the supplier (Janssen & Gao, 2013). This 
unpleasant situation may prompt the channel partner to reevaluate its TSIs and their returns, 
which then could redetermine the impact of these TSIs (Festinger, 1957; Leahy, 2000). By 
measuring and testing the influence of this perceived exclusion, we may be able to shed some 
new light on the mixed findings related to the effects of TSIs in channel relationships. In 
addition, the ability of channel partners to overcome such challenges might depend on how 
motivated they are to pursue their own business objectives (Davis, 2012), also known as an 
achievement orientation. An achievement orientation among resellers likely influences how 
they interpret their own OCLP and thus set their own goals accordingly, such that it appears 
likely to influence the ultimate impact of OCLP. However, no extant literature addresses this 
phenomenon, indicating a clear need for new insights into this source of channel discontent 
and its potentially heterogeneous consequences for supplier–partner relationships.  
Formally, we propose that the concept of being out of the channel loop provides a means 
to capture perceived exclusion in a channel context. Drawing on recent theorizing about 
ostracism, with a conceptual backdrop of TC theory (Ferris, Brown, Berry, & Lian, 2008; 
Williams, 2007), we investigate how OCLP influence the impact of TSIs in supplier–partner 
networks. That is, we predict and demonstrate how the influences of TSIs on opportunistic 
and extra-role behaviors depend on the degree to which PSFs feel excluded from the channel 
loop. Furthermore, through a series of three-way interactions, we establish a contingent effect 
of the channel partner’s achievement orientation on these effects.  
2. Conceptual background 
In interfirm relationships, TSIs are “assets that have little or no value outside the focal 
exchange relationship” (Williamson, 1985, p. 55), which can include specialized facilities, 
equipment, knowledge, and skills (Brown et al., 2000). According to TC theory, TSIs 
determine channel partners’ behavior, by acting as bonds against the investing firm’s 
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opportunistic tendencies (e.g., violating contract terms; Heide & Stump, 1995), which would 
likely provoke retaliation (Provan & Skinner, 1989) that could put its own investment at risk 
(Brown et al., 2009). However, TSIs also lock the investing firm into a longer-term exchange 
relationship, because they increase the costs of switching (Williamson, 1985), such that they 
might promote positive behaviors to ensure the partners’ mutual interests in the longer term. 
Prior literature accordingly reveals mixed results with regard to the outcomes of TSIs as 
structural regulating mechanisms. For example, Ping (1993) identifies a negative relationship 
between TSIs and channel partner opportunism, but Brown et al. (2000) and Crosno et al. 
(2013) report a positive relationship. Table 1 summarizes these mixed findings on the impact 
of TSIs, thus emphasizing the need for further exploration of their impacts. To reconcile 
inconsistent findings, Brown et al. (2009) recommend considering the nature of the 
relationship, the dynamics of social change, and different types of investments (i.e., physical 
vs. knowledge goods). These recommendations accordingly suggest the special relevance of 
TSI research for PSFs, which provide knowledge-intensive, customized services (Heirati, 
O'Cass, Schoefer, & Siahtiri, 2016), such that their specific investments tend to be 
knowledge-based (e.g., obtaining skill certifications, completing product training courses).  
*** Table 1 about here *** 
Ostracism is “a perception of being ignored or excluded by others” (Williams & 
Sommer, 1997, p. 693). Some context-specific conceptualizations capture the sense of an 
exclusionary experience in specific settings, such as linguistic ostracism (Dotan-Eliaz, 
Sommer, & Rubin, 2009) or workplace ostracism (Ferris et al., 2008). In channel networks, 
channel partner perceptions of being excluded by the supplier represent one form of partial 
ostracism. The partners may be excluded just on some occasions or from some activities, 
such as product launches, specific communication campaigns, and incentive structures, but 
they still have access to other resources and support from suppliers—only to a lesser extent 
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than fully included partners. This partial nature of channel partner perceived exclusion from 
the supplier can be nicely captured by the notion of being out of the loop, rather than the 
broader term of ostracism (Jones, Carter-Sowell, & Kelly, 2011; Jones, Carter-Sowell, Kelly, 
& Williams, 2009; Jones & Kelly, 2010). A channel partner’s feeling of being excluded 
arises when it compares its treatment with that of other partners in the distribution network. 
Such a comparative process is not required for ostracism, especially because ostracism can 
arise in one-to-one relationships, rather than only in networks (Jones & Kelly, 2013). 
Accordingly, we define the out-of-the-channel-loop perceptions (OCLP) concept for this 
study as a sense of being ignored or excluded, by a focal supplier in a channel network, from 
specific economic and/or social exchanges.  
Furthermore, OCLP differs fundamentally from relationship norms and commitment, in 
that its formation depends on dynamics at the channel network level, whereas the other two 
result from dynamics in dyadic supplier–channel partner relationships. For example, 
relationship norms and commitment develop during interactions between a supplier and 
channel partner over time, but OCLP only arise if channel partners compare their own 
interaction with the supplier (e.g., accessing resources and support) with the interactions of 
their peers with the same supplier. Thus, OCLP capture the influence of relational dynamics 
from a network perspective, which are not captured by relationship norms or commitment 
from a dyadic relational perspective.  
The experience of OCLP should have direct impacts on attitudes and behaviors in social 
settings, such as negative attitudes toward other group members (Jones et al., 2011) or 
reduced participation in group activities (Jones & Kelly, 2013). However, in supply chain 
networks, the effect likely moves through the transactional relationships. That is, business 
relationships are driven primarily by economic rationales, so we must consider their interplay 
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with the social dynamics, including OCLP, of interfirm relationships (Brown et al., 2009; 
Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009; Rokkan, Heide, & Wathne, 2003).  
Achievement orientation at the individual level influences how individuals approach, 
interpret, and respond to different situations (Kozlowski & Bell, 2006). People with a high 
achievement orientation tend to be confident and willing to take on challenges and set goals 
to improve their current performance. It is an important trait for employees working in 
channel firms too (Pelser et al., 2015), and though the importance of an achievement 
orientation as a personal trait has been well established at the individual staff level, it has not 
been conceptualized at the firm level. To the best of our knowledge, its function in managing 
supplier–channel partner relationships has not been explored either. Drawing from prior 
achievement orientation studies (Weiner & Kukla, 1970), we argue that at the firm level, an 
achievement orientation influences the ways a channel firm approaches, interprets, and 
responds to various situations, including OCLP. For example, an achievement-oriented 
person who encounters difficulties regards them as a challenge that requires more effort to 
overcome; an achievement orientation also grants people confidence that they will be able to 
overcome most challenges through their effort (Atuahene-Gima & Li, 2002; Pelser et al., 
2015). An achievement-oriented firm should act in a similar way, such that the firm’s 
achievement orientation likely influences its interpretation of and response to potential 
challenges and thus the impact of OCLP. For this moderator, we predict its influence on the 
degree to which channel partners believe that OCLP represents a threat to their business.  
3. Hypotheses development 
3.1. Direct effects of TSIs on behavioral intentions 
We examine the impact of TSIs on two behavioral intentions developed by the PSFs in a 
channel: opportunistic and extra-role. Opportunistic behavior implies “a lack of candor or 
honesty in transactions, to include self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1975, p. 9). 
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Channel partners that intend to engage in these behaviors might anticipate a deliberate 
misrepresentation of information, violation of contracts (Wathne & Heide, 2000), 
withholding of critical information, or refraining from agreed-on actions (Murry & Heide, 
1998). As we noted previously, the impact of TSIs on behavioral intentions is subject to 
controversy though (Brown et al., 2000; Crosno & Dahlstrom, 2008; Crosno et al., 2013).  
Prior research indicates that channel partners might plan to engage in more opportunistic 
behaviors to maximize the returns on their TSIs (Brown et al., 2000) and protect their 
investment from abuse by the supplier (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Crosno et al., 2013). 
Moreover, when a partner dedicates specific investments to a supplier, its dependence on the 
supplier increases, and this increased dependence implies that the partner relinquishes some 
control to the supplier (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Heide & John, 1992). Being deprived of 
control in a vulnerable situation may encourage the partner to loosen its moral rules (John, 
1984) and engage in unethical behaviors (i.e., opportunism) to regain some semblance of 
control (Crosno et al., 2013). Considering the mixed findings on the impacts of TSIs, we 
posit that when TSIs are knowledge based, they may encourage, rather than discourage, a 
partner’s opportunistic behavior (Brown et al., 2009). Compared with physical investments 
(e.g., equipment, tools), knowledge-based TSIs are less durable and often lose value at a 
faster rate (Brown et al., 2009). For example, expertise with current products becomes 
obsolete as soon as a new version is introduced to the market, so this knowledge-based asset 
no longer has much value to channel partners. Recognizing these outcomes, PSFs might 
sense greater pressure to recoup investments in knowledge-based assets more quickly, under 
time pressures (e.g., due to constantly updated product versions). They even might feel 
compelled to take “shortcuts,” such as opportunistic behaviors, to generate quicker returns on 
their TSIs. A strong fear or threat of losing knowledge-based TSIs can drive opportunistic 
behaviors and intentions. Therefore, even as we acknowledge the mixed findings about the 
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impacts of TSIs, we posit that the substantial time pressures associated with knowledge-based 
TSIs means that they are more likely to encourage opportunistic behaviors. These 
motivations should be especially pertinent for PSFs, whose TSIs tend to be knowledge based 
(Heirati et al., 2016). In summary, we expect channel partners’ TSIs to be positively 
associated with their opportunistic behavioral intentions.  
Extra-role behavioral intentions instead refer to a channel partner’s plans to perform 
activities to support the supplier, including further investments to promote its products, 
beyond what is formally required by a contract (Wuyts, 2007). By definition, TSIs are 
difficult to redeploy in other exchange relationships, such that they increase switching costs 
and create a lock-in effect (Rokkan et al., 2003). Channel partners that are locked in then may 
engage in behaviors to signal their commitment (Aydin & Özer, 2005). Furthermore, TSIs 
would be wasted were the relationship with the particular supplier to come to an end, due to 
their limited value outside this relationship. This huge cost to the channel partner is 
irretrievable (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Bornstein et al., 1999). Such costs can be especially 
high when investments are intangible, because compared with tangible investments that 
might be adapted to other relationships, intangible investments (e.g., expertise, knowledge 
about a supplier’s product) cannot be shifted. That is, the perceived cost of a loss of 
knowledge-based assets due to a terminated exchange relationship is greater. In this view, 
compared with physical TSIs, knowledge-based TSIs more likely function as sunk costs that 
encourage channel partners to behave in ways that help maintain the exchange relationship 
and avoid the loss of their TSIs, such as extra-role behaviors (Garland, 1990). This view is 
supported by Goodfriend and Agnew’s (2008) finding that investors are more committed to a 
relationship when their investments are intangible rather than tangible in nature. In this view, 
as sunk costs, TSIs influence channel partners to behave in ways to maintain the exchange 
relationship and avoid the loss of their TSIs, such as extra-role behaviors (Garland, 1990).  
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At first glance, it may seem counterintuitive to predict that TSIs trigger opposing 
(opportunistic and extra-role) behaviors, but we argue that they actually seek the same goal: 
maximizing returns on the investment. Companies frequently engage in seemingly conflicting 
behaviors to pursue a particular goal, such as when, to support their overall viability, they 
undertake activities to pursue both short-term and long-term performance goals (Levinthal & 
March, 1993), as is well documented in organizational ambidexterity literature (Lavie, 
Stettner, & Tushman, 2010). For example, companies might hide some information but share 
other information with their business partners (Yang, Fang, Fang, & Chou, 2014). Similarly, 
we posit that channel partners might behave opportunistically to maximize their short-term 
payoffs while also continuing to invest in the supplier to ensure returns in the long term. Such 
a scenario might be particularly likely if the channel partner’s TSIs are intangible and the 
supplier’s monitoring capability is low (Wang, Gu, & Dong, 2013). Thus, we predict that 
knowledge-based TSIs promote both opportunistic and extra-role behaviors by channel 
partners. Formally: 
H1: Channel partners’ TSIs are positively associated with their (a) opportunistic and (b) 
extra-role behavioral intentions. 
3.2. Moderating effects of OCLP 
We argue that OCLP signal to channel partners that they are being disadvantaged compared 
with their peers, in terms of receiving support from and accessing the resources of the 
supplier (Jones et al., 2009). With these OCLP, channel partners likely believe that the 
supplier is not concerned with their interests (Jones et al., 2009), leaving the partners in a 
vulnerable position that might lead them to reevaluate their relationship with the supplier and 
their investments in the relationship. Because they sense they are getting less back from the 
supplier, they may be more motivated to maximize their returns, which amplifies the impact 
of TSIs on their opportunistic behaviors. Furthermore, OCLP send the message that the 
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channel partners lack control over the relationship, because the supplier is exhibiting a lack of 
concern for their interests or their potential negative reactions. This sense of a loss of control 
should motivate partners to engage in more opportunistic behaviors to gain more control over 
the relationship, so that they can better protect their TSIs (Crosno et al., 2013; John, 1984).  
We also contend that OCLP may intensify channel partner’s concerns about sunk costs, 
by amplifying their perceptions of their specific investments in this supplier. Perceived 
exclusion can distort perceptions of the time and effort spent performing a task, such that 
people tend to overestimate those investments when they feel excluded (Tomaka & 
Blascovich, 1994; Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 2003). Thus, compared with its peers, a 
channel partner experiencing OCLP may tend to have an augmented view of its overall 
investments in the supplier, due to its overestimation of intangible, precious resources it has 
devoted to the supplier. Concerns about sunk costs become keener, reflecting this augmented 
perception of investments in the relationship. The intensified sunk cost bias in turn may 
strengthen the impact of TSIs on extra-role behaviors (Molden & Hui, 2011). Accordingly, 
we argue that OCLP enhance the relationship between TSIs and extra-role behavior; 
formally,  
H2: Out-of-the-channel-loop perceptions enhance the positive relationships of channel 
partners’ TSIs with their (a) opportunistic and (b) extra-role behavioral intentions. 
3.3. Moderation by achievement orientation 
Achievement orientation influences channel partners in various ways, including their 
interpretations of the situation and goals. A channel partner with a high achievement 
orientation constantly identifies problems and thinks about how to improve its performance 
(Kozlowski & Bell, 2006). In turn, it is more sensitive to identifying any undesired situations, 
such as being out of the channel loop. This perceived challenge then needs to be overcome. A 
high achievement orientation might prompt greater expectations of a return on investment 
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(Glover, Bumpus, Logan, & Ciesla, 1997) and better treatment from the supplier relative to 
peers. A channel partner with a high achievement orientation cares more about accessing 
resources and getting support from the supplier and may feel disadvantaged to a greater 
degree than do partners with a low achievement orientation if they experience similar levels 
of OCLP. This intensified feeling of being disadvantaged may lead partners to consider their 
returns on investment further reduced, evoking a stronger motivation to try to increase the 
payoff. In addition, with a high achievement orientation, the focus tends to be on autonomy, 
because these actors prefer to explore ways to do things better or accomplish more (Zhou, 
1998). Achievement-oriented channel partners thus seek more control over their relationships 
with suppliers, to ensure they have freedom in how they conduct business. If they experience 
OCLP, these partners also should sense their loss of control to a greater degree than do 
partners with a low achievement orientation. This intensified perception could cause them to 
engage in more aggressive or opportunistic behaviors to gain more control over the supplier 
relationship, so that they can better protect their TSIs. Thus, we expect achievement 
orientation to enhance the impact of OCLP on the relationship between TSIs and 
opportunistic behaviors. 
However, partners with a high achievement orientation also tend to attribute success 
(e.g., strong sales performance) to personal efforts rather than external factors (Weiner & 
Kukla, 1970). These channel partners might believe that the supplier has only a small role in 
their success, such that they still could perform well, even with minimal support. This view 
should reduce the influence of OCLP on their feeling of being locked-in, because they do not 
sense that they are more dependent on the supplier and retain confidence in their ability to 
generate adequate returns on their investment in a reasonable timeframe. In addition, people 
with a high achievement orientation are more worried about attaining growth and 
improvements (Weiner & Kukla, 1970), such that they focus more on gains rather than losses 
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(i.e., missed payoff on their investments) with respect to their TSIs. This tendency in turn 
might reduce the sunk cost bias that we predicted would be amplified by OCLP. Therefore, 
we expect an achievement orientation to attenuate the interaction effect of TSIs and OCLP on 
extra-role behaviors, such as future investments in the supplier. We accordingly propose:  
H3: Achievement orientation (a) positively moderates the interaction effect of OCLP and 
TSIs on opportunistic behavioral intentions, such that the synergetic effect is enhanced, 
but it (b) negatively moderates the interaction effect of OCLP and TSIs on extra-role 
behavioral intentions, such that these synergetic effects are attenuated for channel 
partners with a high achievement motivation.  
Our conceptual model in Figure 1 builds on TC theory, in which TSIs affect channel 
partners’ behavioral intentions (Brown et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2014). It also features OCLP 
and achievement orientations, to capture the influences of the distribution network and the 
individual firm, respectively.  
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
4. Research method 
4.1. Sample and data collection  
The IT services industry is an appropriate setting for testing our conceptual model, because it 
features a large number of PSFs that function as channel partners and often sell products or 
services on behalf of a single, dominant supplier (CompTIA, 2016). The power asymmetry in 
this type of network leaves PSFs especially vulnerable to suppliers. In collaboration with an 
industry association that includes more than 5,000 registered PSFs, including systems 
integrators, managed service providers, value-added resellers, IT consultants, cloud 
specialists, and IT solution providers, we distributed an online survey to 600 randomly drawn 
PSFs, asking senior managers with knowledge about channel relationships and supplier 
decisions to complete the surveys. 
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The 192 questionnaires returned represent a response rate of 32%. To ensure the 
respondents were competent to answer the questions, we followed O’Cass, Heirati, and Ngo’s 
(2014) approach and asked respondents to rate, on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = “no 
knowledge at all” to 7 = “very knowledgeable”), their knowledge about dealings with channel 
suppliers. We dropped any respondent who scored below 4, leaving 155 professional IT 
service firms to be included in the final sample. The respondents, appropriate for this study, 
include top-level managers such as CEOs and managing directors (31.3%) and middle-level 
managers such as channel managers/directors, sales and marketing managers/directors, and 
procurement managers (68.7%). In terms of company size, 12.5% of the sample had less than 
10 employees, 21.9% had 11–20 employees, 23.4% had 21–50 employees, 20.8% had 51–
100 employees, 8.9% had 101–200 employees, and 12.5% had more than 200 employees.  
To check for non-response bias, we compared early respondents (first 30) against late 
respondents (last 30) and found no significant differences for any of the constructs 
(Armstrong & Overton, 1977). In addition, we compared the participating firm with a random 
group of 50 nonparticipating firms in terms of company size and age and found no significant 
difference. Therefore, non-response bias does not appear to be a concern.  
4.2. Measures 
We pretested the questionnaire among 20 professionals in the IT services industry and asked 
them to comment on any items they found ambiguous or difficult to understand. Minor 
modifications were made accordingly.  
The measurement scales for all the constructs came from prior literature and offer proven 
reliability and validity. We made some minor modifications to fit the study context. The 
Appendix contains the complete list of items with their factor loadings, reliability, and 
average variance extracted (AVE) statistics. For the transaction-specific investments 
measure, we adopted three items from Wang, Gu, and Dong (2013) and Dahlquist and 
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Griffith (2014) that capture knowledge-based TSIs by professional IT service firms. The 
measure of out-of-the-channel-loop perceptions relied on five items from O’Reilly, 
Robinson, Berdahl, and Banki (2015) and Stamper and Masterson (2002) that reflect the 
channel partner’s sense of being ignored or excluded from the supplier’s channel network. To 
capture achievement orientation, we adopted four items from Atuahene-Gima and Li (2002), 
in which we shift the referent point to reflect firm-level achievement orientation (Chan, 
1998), or the extent to which channel partners are confident they can achieve goals and 
overcome challenges. The four items to measure opportunistic behavioral intentions were 
adapted from Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan (2007) and Wang et al. (2013); they capture the 
channel partner’s intention to engage in unethical behaviors. Extra-role behavioral intentions 
rely on three items from Kim, Hibbard, and Swain (2011) that indicate a partner’s willingness 
to invest further in the relationship with the focal supplier. All items were measured with 
seven-point, Likert-type scales anchored by 1 = “strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree.” 
We also included control variables that may influence behavior in the channel: firm size, 
market uncertainty, exclusive dealing, and strategic importance. Firms in the IT industry 
differ greatly in size, so we include a measure based on the number of employees. Market 
uncertainty, reflecting variations in the market environment and sales forecasts, was 
measured with a three-item, seven-point, Likert scale extracted from Wang et al.’s (2013) 
research. For the measure of exclusive dealing, we asked the respondents if they carried 
alternative products, produced by other suppliers (yes or no) (Frazier, Maltz, Antia, & 
Rindfleisch, 2009). Finally, the strategic importance measure used a single item from 
Dahlquist and Griffith (2014) that asked how important the focal supplier was to their 
business, relative to alternative suppliers.  
4.3 Reliability and validity  
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To evaluate the psychometric properties of the constructs, we performed confirmatory factor 
analysis using AMOS 22, software suite 9. Table 2 contains the model fit indices, factor 
loadings, composite reliability, and AVE values for the constructs. The overall chi-square 
goodness-of-fit index for the model is 270.73 (df = 191; p < .05), with a comparative fit index 
of .97, root mean square error of approximation of .05, standardized root mean square 
residual of .05, incremental fit index of .97, and Tucker-Lewis index of .96. Thus, the 
measurement model fit the data adequately (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004). To test for 
convergent validity, we checked the significance and magnitude of the item loadings; all 
items loaded significantly on their respective constructs and had standardized loadings of at 
least .71. In addition, all of the AVEs were above the recommended threshold of .50, in 
further support of convergent validity (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
The composite reliability values were greater than .80, suggesting acceptable reliability (Hair, 
Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). With respect to discriminant validity, we followed Fornell 
and Larcker’s (1981) procedure; we present the correlations among the variables in Table 3. 
The square roots of the AVE for all constructs were greater than their correlations with any 
other constructs in the study, indicating discriminant validity (Chin, 2010).  
*** Table 2 and 3 about here *** 
4.4 Common method bias 
We also sought to account for the potential impact of common method bias, so we took 
proper procedures in our survey design and performed statistical checks, in line with 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff’s (2003) recommendations. First, respondents 
were guaranteed confidentiality, assured that there were no right or wrong answers, and asked 
to answer the questions as honestly as possible. Second, the wording of each item was 
carefully constructed to avoid ambiguity or vagueness. The constructs we used to measure the 
channel firm’s behavior are generally concrete (e.g., opportunism, investments), which also 
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helps reduce the potential for bias (Rindfleisch, Malter, Ganesan, & Moorman, 2008). Third, 
the survey included different response formats (i.e., predictor and criterion questions placed 
in various locations), to prevent respondents from guessing the studied relationships.  
Then, to test statistically for common method bias, we performed Harman’s single-factor 
test. The first factor accounted for only 32% of the total variance, so common method bias 
was not a significant concern (Podsakoff et al., 2003). With a marker variable approach, we 
included industry experience, which is theoretically unrelated to at least one variable in the 
model (Lindell & Whitney, 2001). We adjusted the correlations among the variables by using 
the lowest positive correlation between this marker variable and other latent constructs 
(i.e., .02). Only small differences emerged between the original and adjusted correlations 
(i.e., less than .03), and the original coefficient values and associated significance levels did 
not change after this adjustment (Chung, Wang, Huang, & Yang, 2016). This test confirmed 
that common method bias was unlikely. Finally, with an unmeasured latent method factor 
approach, we estimated the model with and without the latent method factor and noticed no 
significant changes in factor loadings or path coefficients (Teller, Alexander, & Floh, 2016). 
Accordingly, common method bias does not appear to be a problem for this study.  
5. Analysis and results 
We use partial least squares (PLS) to test all the hypothesized main effects and two-way 
interaction effects. In Model 1, we included the main effects of all predictor and control 
variables, then added the two-way interactions in Model 2 (see Table 4). To test the three-
way interaction effects, we employed moderated regression; it would be inappropriate to test 
them in PLS due to standardization issues (Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2017). Combining 
structural equation modeling with regression analysis to test moderation effects is a well-
established practice in marketing literature (Schmitz & Ganesan, 2014; Yim, Chan, & Lam, 
2012). We mean-centered the variables in the model before creating the interaction terms 
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(Aiken & West, 1991). According to the regression analysis, the variance inflation factors are 
lower than the cut-off value (highest value = 4.75) (Hair et al., 2010), so multicollinearity is 
not a concern. The standardized regression coefficients and their respective p-values are in 
Table 4.  
*** Table 4 about here *** 
5.1. Results  
As the results in Table 4 reveal, we find a significant positive relationship between TSIs and 
opportunistic behavioral intentions (β = .23, p < .05), in support of H1a. However, we find no 
significant relationships of TSIs with extra-role behavioral intentions, so we cannot confirm 
H1b. In terms of the moderating role of OCLP, it positively moderates the relationships of 
TSIs with opportunistic (β = .22, p < .05) and extra-role (β = .21, p < .05) behavioral 
intentions, in support of H2a–b. The analyses also support a moderating role of achievement 
orientation. Consistent with H3a, achievement orientation positively moderates the interaction 
effect between OCLP and TSIs on opportunistic behavior intentions (β = .15, p < .05). 
Meanwhile, it negatively moderates the interaction effects on extra-role behavior intentions 
(H3b, β = -.16, p < .05). That is, all elements of H3 receive support.  
6. Discussion  
This study focuses on the impact of TSIs on interfirm relationships and the boundary 
conditions that affect such impacts in the context of PSFs. Accordingly, we adopted TC 
theory as the overarching theory for the proposed model; it enables us to predict the impact of 
TSIs on channel partners’ behaviors, to form the baseline for our model. To select the 
dependent variables, we also relied on TC theory that predicts the specific effect of TSIs on 
an investor’s (i.e., channel partner in this study) behaviors. Specifically, noting the lock-in 
effect suggested by TC theory, we predict that TSIs encourage channel partner behaviors that 
benefit both parties in the exchange relationship (e.g., extra-role behavior). Willingness to 
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invest is a form of positive extra-role behavior, because the channel partner makes the 
investments voluntarily, oriented toward helping the supplier (Kim, Hibbard, & Swain, 2011; 
Wuyts, 2007). Studying this particular behavior enables us to capture partner’s extra-role 
behaviors that relate more specifically to TSIs, a focal construct in this study. However, 
noting the controversy surrounding the effect of TSIs on investors’ opportunistic behaviors, 
we also include them as a dependent variable, to shed new light on this channel relationship 
issue. In line with recent developments (Liu et al., 2014; Tangpong, Hung, & Ro, 2010), we 
introduce two novel, conditional variables (i.e., OCLP and achievement orientation) to 
explore how specific aspects of an exchange relationship may influence the effects of TSIs, 
as predicted by TC theory. Both these boundary conditions help explain the impact of TSIs 
on channel partners’ behavioral intentions.  
Industry reports suggest that a feeling of being excluded by a supplier affects channel 
partners’ behaviors, such as their intentions to participate in grey markets (Coyne, 2012) or 
switch to other suppliers (Hoffman, 2008), yet no empirical evidence has confirmed these 
potential impacts. We add some nuance to extant understanding of how TSIs influence 
channel partners’ behavioral intentions; the impact is moderated by OCLP, which enhances 
the effects of TSIs on both negative (opportunism) and positive (extra-role) behavioral 
intentions.  
With this investigation of TSIs as important structural mechanisms for managing channel 
relationships, we do not find exclusive support for either a bonding (e.g., mitigating 
opportunistic behaviors) or a lock-in (e.g., promoting extra-role) effect. Rather, TSIs by PSFs 
in the IT service industry are associated with opportunistic behaviors. Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that suppliers should encourage channel partners to commit more and 
highly specific investments to their exchange relationship, our findings suggest they should 
take a cautious approach, especially if the investments are knowledge based in nature.  
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The results for the two-way interaction effects also reveal that the partner’s achievement 
orientation reduces the impact of TSIs on its extra-role behavior. We did not test this 
relationship formally, but the finding aligns with our argument about the role of achievement 
orientation in relation to TSIs. That is, it likely reduces the lock-in effect of TSIs, thereby 
mitigating the sunk cost bias they may have developed, in association with their investment 
in the supplier. In turn, it could reduce their tendency to invest further in their relationship 
with the supplier. However, our research goal was to explore the role of achievement 
orientation as a second moderator that helps explain the effect of OCLP, so to keep the study 
focused—not distracted by the two-way interaction effects between TSIs and achievement 
orientation—we have not formally developed a hypothesis about this relationship.  
Finally, in our effort to understand the boundary role of OCLP and account for 
heterogeneity among channel partners, we examined how a PSF’s achievement orientation 
interacts with TSIs and OCLP to influence their behaviors. To a certain extent, OCLP 
represent hurdles in the channel relationship, such that channel partners take less priority than 
other players in the network and receive both less support and fewer resources (Jones et al., 
2009). An achievement orientation influences channel partners’ interpretation of these 
hurdles and the goals that they set in response (Kozlowski & Bell, 2006), so it also affects the 
impact of OCLP. Our findings highlight the importance of considering channel members’ 
heterogeneity when managing relationships (Pelser et al., 2015); particular attention should 
center on partners with high achievement orientations, which appear relatively more self-
focused and aggressive.  
7. Managerial implications  
Suppliers in the IT industry work with many channel partners and are unlikely to treat 
them all equally, whether due to their limited resources or their strategic considerations. 
However, by managing the perceptions carefully, suppliers could capitalize on OCLP in their 
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distribution channels. For channel partners who feel out of the channel loop, suppliers could 
tactically remind them of the specific investments they already made in the relationship (e.g., 
training sessions attended, advanced skill certifications obtained); doing so would help 
enhance their sunk cost bias, which should increase behaviors that benefit the exchange 
relationship.  
Our study also suggests that suppliers should segment their channel partners according to 
their OCLP and achievement orientations. For high achievement-oriented channel partners, 
suppliers should minimize OLCP, such as by proactively demonstrating their concern and 
respect, to reduce any sense of being excluded or ignored. For example, they might pay 
regular visits to and engage in regular communication with these partners to minimize their 
OCLP.  
8. Limitations and further research  
Some limitations of our study suggest directions for further research. First, we tested our 
hypotheses in the single context of professional IT service firms. With this approach, we 
could control for extraneous sources of variation and capture the unique features of our focal 
construct (i.e., knowledge-based TSIs). However, this approach also demands caution before 
applying our findings to other channel contexts. Additional research could test our model in 
less knowledge-intensive channel contexts, to validate our findings and improve their 
generalizability. Second, our cross-sectional survey approach cannot reveal the interplay of 
the focal constructs over time. Longitudinal designs thus would be valuable. Third, in 
addition to OCLP and achievement orientation, studies might explore other potentially 
relevant moderators to explain the opposing behaviors triggered by TSI in more detail, such 
as entitlement or deservingness (Feather, 2003), which also constitute important sources of 
heterogeneity among channel partners (Pelser et al., 2015). Fourth, we measure channel 
partners’ extra-role behavior according to their willingness to make further investments in the 
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supplier (Kim et al., 2011), which captures only a particular form of extra-role behavior. 
Additional research could apply Wuyts’s (2007) scale to gain a broader view of extra-role 
behaviors in supplier–channel partner relationships and thus complement our findings. 
In addition, in our correlation results, opportunistic behavior correlated negatively with 
TSIs (albeit insignificantly). Yet in the regression results, this relationship changed, to 
become positive and significant. Similarly, Brown et al. (2000) revealed that the relationship 
between TSIs and opportunism changed from negative and insignificant to positive and 
significant when they shifted their analysis from bivariate to multivariate. We were 
disappointed that our moderator did not fully explain the seemingly conflicting behavior 
caused by TSIs. A possible explanation could relate to the absence of a control or moderating 
variable in the analysis (Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004). We hope continued 
studies explore other potential moderators and control variables to explicate the relationships 
between TSI and opportunistic behavior. 
We also acknowledge that envy is similar to OCLP; it “occurs when a person lacks 
another's superior quality, achievement, or possession and either desires it or wishes the other 
lacked it. It occurs when this shortcoming exists in a domain that is self-definitional” (Parrott 
& Smith, 1993, p. 906). But OCLP instead results from a comparison with peers, related to 
treatment received from a third party; it indicates a standing relative to peers within a 
network (Jones et al., 2009). Envy may arise in both dyadic and more expansive relationships 
(Veiga, Baldridge, & Markóczy, 2014), but OCLP require the broader networks (i.e., at least 
two in-the-loop members and one out-of-the-loop member). In terms of their impact, envy as 
an emotion can lead to either negative (similar to opportunism) or positive (extra-role) 
behaviors, depending on whether it is malicious or benign (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & 
Pieters, 2009). Despite this similarity, such that envy and OCLP may lead to negative or 
positive behavioral outcomes, the underlying mechanisms of their impact differ 
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fundamentally. That is, the influence of OCLP on behavior stems from its threat to 
fundamental needs, such as belonging and control (Jones & Kelly, 2013). Envy instead 
appears to affect behaviors mainly through a mediating effect of emotions, with little 
connection to fundamental needs (Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004). 
Finally, most prior channel relationship literature treats TSIs as a unidimensional 
construct, but a more specific approach, reflecting unique assets dedicated to the relationship 
(Lohtia, Brooks, & Krapfel, 1994), could provide new insights into the impact of TSIs in 
channel relationships. We encourage studies that adopt multidimensional operationalizations 
of TSIs, which may reveal further complexity with regard to their influences. 
  
24 
 
References 
Aiken, L. S., & Stephen, G. W. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting 
interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Anderson, J. C., & Gerbing, D. W. (1988). Structural equation modeling in practice: A 
review of recommended two-step approach. Psychological Bulletin, 103(3), 411-423. 
Arkes, H., & Blumer, C. (1985). The psychology of sunk costs. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 35, 124–140. 
Armstrong, J. S., & Overton, T. S. (1977). Estimating nonresponse bias in mail surveys. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 16, 396-402. 
Atuahene-Gima, K., & Li, H. (2002). When does trust matter? Antecedents and contingent 
effects of supervisee trust on performance in selling new products in China and the 
United States. Journal of Marketing, 66(3), 61-81.  
Aydin, S., & Özer, G. (2005). The analysis of antecedents of customer loyalty in the Turkish 
mobile telecommunication market. European Journal of Marketing, 39(7/8), 910-925.  
Bornstein, B. H., Emler, A. C., & Chapman. G. B. (1999). Rationality in medical treatment 
decisions: Is there a sunk-cost effect? Social Science and Medicine, 49, 215-222. 
Brehm, S. S., & Brehm, J. W. (1981). Psychological reactance: A theory of freedom and 
control. New York: Academic. 
Brown, J. R., Crosno, J. L., & Dev, C. S. (2009). The effects of transaction-specific 
investments in marketing channels: The moderating role of relational norms. Journal of 
Marketing Theory & Practice, 17(4), 317-333.  
Brown, J. R., Dev, C. S., & Lee, D. J. (2000). Managing marketing channel opportunism: The 
efficacy of alternative governance mechanisms. Journal of Marketing, 64(2), 51-65. 
25 
 
Chan, D. (1998). Functional relations among constructs in the same content domain at 
different levels of analysis: A typology of composition models. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 83(2), 234-246.  
Chin, W. W. (2010). How to write up and report PLS analyses. In V. Esposito Vinzi, W.W. 
Chin, J. Henseler, & H. Wang (Eds.), Handbook of partial least squares, Springer 
handbooks of computational statistics. Springer-Verlag: Heidelberg, Berlin, Germany. 
Chung, H. F. L., Wang, C. L., Huang, P., & Yang, Z. (2016). Organizational capabilities and 
business performance: When and how does the dark side of managerial ties matter? 
Industrial Marketing Management, 55, 70-82.  
CompTIA. (2016). IT industry outlook 2016. Retrieved from 
https://www.comptia.org/resources/it-industry-outlook-2016-final. 
Coyne, A. (2012). Ditching the reseller: Vendors going direct. Retrieved from 
http://www.crn.com.au/News/321908,ditching-the-reseller-vendors-going-direct.aspx. 
Crosno, J. L., & Dahlstrom, R. (2008). A meta-analytic review of opportunism in exchange 
relationships. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 36(2), 191-201.  
Crosno, J. L., Manolis, C., & Dahlstrom, R. (2013). Toward understanding passive 
opportunism in dedicated channel relationships. Marketing Letters, 24(4), 353-368.  
Dahlquist, S. H., & Griffith, D. A. (2014). Multidyadic industrial channels: Understanding 
component supplier profits and original equipment manufacturer behavior. Journal of 
Marketing, 78(4), 59-79. 
Davis, K. (2012). When the rock star sales rep becomes a prima donna. Retrieved from 
http://www.toplineleadership.com/2012/12/when-the-rock-star-sales-rep-becomes-a-
prima-donna/. 
Dotan-Eliaz, O., Sommer, K. L., & Rubin, Y. S. (2009). Multilingual groups: Effects of 
linguistic ostracism on felt rejection and anger, coworker attraction, perceived team 
26 
 
potency, and creative performance. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 31(4), 363-
375. 
Feather, N. T. (2003). Distinguishing between deservingness and entitlement: Earned 
outcomes versus lawful outcomes. European Journal of Social Psychology, 33(3), 367-
385. 
Ferris, D. L., Brown, D. J., Berry, J. W., & Lian, H. (2008). The development and validation 
of the workplace ostracism scale. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93(6), 1348-1366.  
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. F. (1981). Evaluating structural equation models with unobserved 
variables and measurement error. Journal of Marketing Research, 18(1), 39-50. 
Frazier, G. L., Maltz, E., Antia, K. D., & Rindfleisch, A. (2009). Distributor sharing of 
strategic information with suppliers. Journal of Marketing, 73(4), 31-43. 
Garland, H. (1990). Throwing good money after bad: The effect of sunk costs on the decision 
to escalate commitment to an ongoing project. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 728-
731. 
Gilbert, J. (2015). Raising the bar. Retrieved from http://www.channelweb.co.uk/crn-
uk/feature/2389587/raising-the-bar#.  
Glover, S. H., Bumpus, M. A., Logan, J. E., & Ciesla, J. R. (1997). Re-examining the 
influence of individual values on ethical decision making. Journal of Business Ethics, 
16(12/13), 1319-1329.  
Goodfriend, W., & Agnew, C. R. (2008). Sunken costs and desired plans: Examining 
different types of investments in close relationships. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 34(12), 1639-1652. 
Hair, Jr. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., & Anderson, R. E. (2010). Multivariate data analysis 
(7th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education International. 
27 
 
Hair, Jr. F., Hult, G. T. M., Ringle, C., & Sarstedt, M. (2017). A primer on partial least 
squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Handley, S. M., & Benton Jr., W. C. (2012). The influence of exchange hazards and power 
on opportunism in outsourcing relationships. Journal of Operations Management, 30(1-
2), 55-68. 
Haranas, M. (2016). 5 surprising statistics about Cisco's channel strategy. Retrieved from 
http://www.crn.com/slide-shows/networking/300081194/5-surprising-statistics-about-
ciscos-channel-strategy.htm/pgno/0/4.  
Heide, J. B., & John, G. (1992). Do norms matter in marketing relationships? Journal of 
Marketing, 56(2), 32-44. 
Heide, J. B., & Stump, R. L. (1995). Performance implications of buyer–supplier 
relationships in industrial markets: A transaction cost explanation. Journal of Business 
Research, 32(1), 57-66. 
Heide, J. B., Wathne, K. H., & Rokkan, A. I. (2007). Inter-firm monitoring, social contracts, 
and relationship outcomes. Journal of Marketing Research, 44(3), 425-433. 
Heirati, N., O'Cass, A., Schoefer, K., & Siahtiri, V. (2016). Do professional service firms 
benefit from customer and supplier collaborations in competitive, turbulent 
environments? Industrial Marketing Management, 55, 50-58.  
Hoffman, T. (2008). Symantec partners outraged over direct sales for top customers. 
Retrieved from http://www.crn.com/news/security/209100295/symantec-partners-
outraged-over-direct-sales-for-top-customers.htm  
Janssen, O., & Gao, L. (2013). Supervisory responsiveness and employee self-perceived 
status and voice behavior. Journal of Management, 1-19. 
28 
 
John, G. (1984). An empirical investigation of some antecedents of opportunism in a 
marketing channel. Journal of Marketing Research, 21(3), 278-289.  
Jones, E. E., Carter-Sowell, A. R., & Kelly, J. R. (2011). Participation matters: Psychological 
and behavioral consequences of information exclusion in groups. Group Dynamics: 
Theory, Research, and Practice, 15(4), 311-325. 
Jones, E. E., Carter-Sowell, A. R., Kelly, J. R., & Williams, K. D. (2009). ‘I'm out of the 
loop': Ostracism through information exclusion. Group Processes & Intergroup 
Relations, 12(2), 157-174.  
Jones, E. E., & Kelly, J. R. (2010). “Why am I out of the loop?” Attributions influence 
responses to information exclusion. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(9), 
1186-1201.  
Jones, E. E., & Kelly, J. R. (2013). The psychological costs of knowledge specialization in 
groups: Unique expertise leaves you out of the loop. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 121(2), 174-182. 
Kiernan, S. (2014). What do resellers really want from vendor programs? Retrieved from 
http://www.crn.com.au/Feature/389523,what-do-resellers-really-want-from-vendor-
programs.aspx. 
Kim, S. K., Hibbard, J. D. & Swain, S. D. (2011). Commitment in marketing channels: 
Mitigator or aggravator of the effects of destructive acts? Journal of Retailing, 87(4), 
521-539.  
Kozlowski, S. W. J., & Bell, B. S. (2006). Disentangling achievement orientation and goal 
setting: Effects on self-regulatory processes. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91(4), 900-
916. 
Lavie, D., Stettner, U., & Tushman, M. L. (2010). Exploration and exploitation within and 
across organizations. Academy of Management Annals, 4(1), 109-155. 
29 
 
Leahy, R. L. (2000). Sunk costs and resistance to change. Journal of Cognitive 
Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, 14, 355–371. 
Levinthal, D. A., & March, J. G. (1993). The myopia of learning. Strategic Management 
Journal, 14(2), 95-112. 
Lindell, M. K., & Whitney, D. J. (2001). Accounting for method variance in cross-sectional 
research designs. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(1), 114-121. 
Liu, Y., Liu, T., & Li, Yuan. (2014). How to inhibit a partner's strong and weak forms of 
opportunism: Impacts of network embeddedness and bilateral TSIs. Industrial Marketing 
Management, 43(2), 280-292. 
Liu, Y., Luo, Y., & Liu, T. (2009). Governing buyer–supplier relationships through 
transactional and relational mechanisms: Evidence from China. Journal of Operations 
Management, 27(4), 294-309.  
Lohtia, R., Brooks, C. M., & Krapfel, R. E. (1994). What constitutes a transaction-specific 
asset? An examination of the dimensions and types. Journal of Business Research, 30(3), 
261-270. 
Marsh, H. W., Hau, K. T., & Wen, Z. (2004). In search of golden rules: Comment on 
hypothesis testing approaches to setting cutoff values for fit indexes and dangers in 
overgeneralizing Hu & Bentler’s (1999) findings. Structural Equation Modeling, 11, 
320-341. 
Molden, D. C., & Hui, C. M. (2011). Promoting de-escalation of commitment: A regulatory-
focus perspective on sunk costs. Psychological Science, 6, 8–12. 
Murry, J. P., & Heide, J. B. (1998). Managing promotion program participation within 
manufacturer-retailer relationships. Journal of Marketing, 62(1), 58-68. 
30 
 
O'Cass, A., Heirati, N., & Ngo, L. V. (2014). Achieving new product success via the 
synchronization of exploration and exploitation across multiple levels and functional 
areas. Industrial Marketing Management, 43(5), 862-872. 
O’Reilly, J., Robinson, S. L., Berdahl, J. L., & Banki, S. (2015). Is negative attention better 
than no attention? The comparative effects of ostracism and harassment at work. 
Organization Science, 26(3), 774-793. 
Parrott, W. G., & Smith. R. H. (1993). Distinguishing the experiences of envy and jealousy. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(6), 906–920. 
Paulhus, D. L., Robins, R. W., Trzesniewski, K. H., & Tracy, J. L. (2004). Two replicable 
suppressor situations in personality research. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 39(2), 
303-328. 
Pelser, J., de Ruyter, K., Wetzels, M., Grewal, D., Cox, D., & van Beuningen, J. (2015). B2B 
channel partner programs: Disentangling indebtedness from gratitude. Journal of 
Retailing, 91(4), 660-978. 
Ping, Jr., R. A. (1993). The effects of satisfaction and structural constraints on retailer 
exiting, voice, loyalty, opportunism, and neglect. Journal of Retailing, 69(3), 320-352.  
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J. -Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method 
biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended 
remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), 879-903. 
Provan, K. G., & Skinner, S. J. (1989). Interorganizational dependence and control as 
predictors of opportunism in dealer–supplier relations. Academy of Management Journal, 
32(1), 202-212. 
Rindfleisch, A., Malter, A. J., Ganesan, S., & Moorman, C. (2008). Cross-sectional versus 
longitudinal research: Concepts, findings, and guidelines. Journal of Marketing 
Research. 45(3), 261-279. 
31 
 
Rokkan, A. I., Heide, J. B., & Wathne, K. H. (2003). Specific investments in marketing 
relationships: Expropriation and bonding effects. Journal of Marketing Research, 40(2), 
210-224.  
Sarker, S., Sarker S., Sahaym, A., & Bjorn-Andersen, A. (2012). Exploring value co-creation 
in relationships between an ERP vendor and its partners: A revelatory case study. MIS 
Quarterly, 36(1), 317-338. 
Schaubroeck, J., & Lam, S. S. K. (2004). Comparing lots before and after: Promotion 
rejectees' invidious reactions to promotees. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 94(1), 33–47. 
Schmitz, C., & Ganesan, S. (2014). Managing customer and organizational complexity in 
sales organizations. Journal of Marketing, 78(6), 59-77. 
Scott, K. L., Restubog, S. L. D., & Zagenczyk, T. J. (2013). A social exchange-based model 
of the antecedents of workplace exclusion. Journal of Applied Psychology, 98(1), 37-48. 
Stamper, C. L., & Masterson, S. S. (2002). Insider or outsider? How employee perceptions of 
insider status affect their work behavior. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 23(8), 875-
894. 
Tangpong, C., Hung, K.-T., & Ro, Y. K. (2010). The interaction effect of relational norms 
and agent cooperativeness on opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships. Journal of 
Operations Management, 28(5), 398-414. 
Teller, C., Alexander, A., & Floh, A. (2016). The impact of competition and cooperation on 
the performance of a retail agglomeration and its stores. Industrial Marketing 
Management, 52, 6-17.  
Tomaka, J., & Blascovich, J. (1994). Effects of justice beliefs on cognitive appraisal of and 
subjective physiological, and behavioral responses to potential stress. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 67(4), 732-740. 
32 
 
TSL Marketing (2013). Systematic channel partner recruitment – TSL Marketing – an 
introduction. Retrieved from http://www.businesszone.co.uk/blogs/tslmarketing/tsl-
marketing-business-business-lead-generation/systematic-channel-partner-recrui.  
Twenge, J. M., Catanese, K. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2003). Social exclusion and the 
deconstructed state: Time perception, meaninglessness, lethargy, lack of emotion, and 
self-awareness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(3), 409-423. 
van de Ven, N., Zeelenberg, M., & Pieters, R. (2009). Leveling up and down: The 
experiences of benign and malicious envy. Emotion, 9(3), 419-429.  
Veiga, J. F., Baldridge, D. C., & Markóczy, L. (2014). Toward greater understanding of the 
pernicious effects of workplace envy. International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 25(17), 2364-2381. 
Wang, D. T., Gu, F. F., & Dong, M. C. (2013). Observer effects of punishment in a 
distribution network. Journal of Marketing Research, 50(5), 627-643. 
Wathne, K. H., & Heide, J. B. (2000). Opportunism in interfirm relationships: Forms, 
outcomes, and solutions. Journal of Marketing, 64(4), 36-51.  
Weiner, B., & Kukla, A. (1970). An attributional analysis of achievement motivation. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 15(1), 1-20.  
Williams, K. D. (2007). Ostracism. Annual Review of Psychology, 58(1), 425-452. 
Williams, K. D., & Sommer, K. L. (1997). Social ostracism by coworkers: Does rejection 
lead to loafing or compensation? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(7), 693-
706.  
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and anti-trust implications. 
New York: Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational 
contracting. New York: Free Press. 
33 
 
Wright, R. (2013). Beneath the surface: Partners question Microsoft's channel commitment. 
Retrieved from http://www.crn.com/news/mobility/240157770/beneath-the-surface-
partners-question-microsofts-channel-commitment.htm.  
Wuyts, S. (2007). Extra-role behavior in buyer–supplier relationships. International Journal 
of Research in Marketing, 24(4), 301-311. 
Yang, S.-M., Fang, S.-C., Fang, S.-R., & Chou, C.-H. (2014). Knowledge exchange and 
knowledge protection in interorganizational learning: The ambidexterity perspective. 
Industrial Marketing Management, 43(2), 346-358. 
Yim, C. K., Chan, K. W., & Lam, S. S. K. (2012). Do customers and employees enjoy service 
participation? Synergistic effects of self- and other-efficacy. Journal of Marketing, 76(6), 
121-140.  
Zhou, J. (1998). Feedback valence, feedback style, task autonomy, and achievement 
orientation: Interactive effects on creative performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
83(2), 261-276.  
34 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model 
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Table 1. Mixed findings on the impact of TSIs 
 Studies  Theoretical Lens Relationship between TSIs and 
Investor’s Opportunistic Behavior  
Key Rationale  
Handley & Benton 
(2012) 
Transaction cost 
theory 
Negative Perceived retaliation from exchange partner discourages 
opportunistic behavior. 
Ping (1993) Transaction cost 
theory 
Negative Fear of economic loss discourages opportunistic behavior. 
Brown et al. (2000) Transaction cost 
theory 
Positive Motivation to generate additional return on investments encourages 
opportunistic behavior.  
Crosno et al. 
(2013) 
Psychological 
reactance theory 
Positive Motivation to regain more control to protect investments 
encourages opportunistic behavior.  
Crosno & 
Dahlstrom (2008) 
Transaction cost 
theory 
No relationship Transaction cost theory may be limited by its focus on controlling 
an exchange partner’s behavior. 
 
  
36 
 
Table 2. Measurement items and validity assessment 
Construct Loadings t-value CR AVE 
Transaction-specific investment   .86 .67 
If this relationship were to end, we would be wasting a lot of knowledge that is tailored to the relationship.  .76 11.02   
We have invested a great deal in building up the relationship with this supplier. .87    
If this relationship were to end we would lose a lot of investments.  .83 12.63   
Out-of-the-channel-loop perception   .90 .63 
Compared to how some resellers are treated by this supplier, it feels like …     
We are left out. .71 10.47   
We are excluded. .74    
We are not part of its channel partner networks. .82 10.16   
We are ‘outsider’ in its channel partner networks. .89 10.94   
We are on the fringes of its reseller networks.   .81 9.93   
Partner’s achievement orientation   .94 .78 
We have confidence in our ability to meet most sales objectives. .83 15.34   
We expect to perform at highest level. .93    
We consistently set challenging sales goals for us to attain. .90 18.43   
We continuously try to improve our sales performance. .88 17.60   
Partner’s opportunistic behavioral intention   .92 .75 
We may interpret terms of the contractual agreement in our favor at the supplier’s expense. .88 13.45   
We may not keep all promises that were made when we began the relationship with this supplier. .83    
We will try to take advantage of “holes” in our contractual agreement to further our own interests. .88 13.49   
We may violate some contractual terms in certain circumstances. .87 13.46   
Partner’s extra-role behavioral intention   .88 .72 
Our level of investment in selling this supplier’s product will increase in the near future. .81 12.02   
We are willing to invest more to support this supplier’s product line. .87    
We plan to make future investments to support this supplier’s product line. .86 12.99   
Market uncertainty   .86 .66 
It is difficult to monitor the market environment trends for our supplier’s products. .87    
The sales forecasts for our supplier’s products are quite inaccurate. .82 10.93   
The market in which we operate is quite unpredictable. .75 10.00   
Notes: CR = composite reliability, AVE = average variance extracted. The fit indices are as follows: χ² = 270.73; p < .01; χ²/df = 1.42; root mean square error of 
approximation = .05; confirmatory fit index = .97; incremental fit index = .97; Tucker-Lewis index = .96; goodness-of-fit index = .87; adjusted goodness-of-fit index = .83; 
standardized root mean residual = .05.   
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Table 3. Correlations, means, and standard deviationsᵃ 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Transaction-specific investments .82          
2. Out-of-the-channel-loop 
perception 
-.17* .79         
3. Achievement orientation  .71** -.25** 0.88        
4. Opportunistic behavioral intention  -.11 .58** -.31** .87       
5. Extra-role behavioral intention .58** -.22** .44** -.07 .85      
6. Market uncertainty  .29** .17* .19* .29** .16* .81     
7. Firm sizeᵇ .08 .09 -.14 .13 .11 .02 -    
8. Strategic importance .81** -.25** .61** -.20* .61** .19* .06 -   
9. Exclusive dealingᶜ -.04 .13 -.01 .01 -.02 -.10 -.00 -.08 -  
10. Industry experience .09 -.03 .14 .06 .04 .05 .05 .07 -.00 - 
           
Mean 4.68 3.21 4.95 3.45 4.39 4.18 3.34 4.78 .30 4.66 
SD 1.35 1.46 1.44 1.54 1.33 1.25 1.54 1.48 .46 1.42 
ᵃThe square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) is on the diagonal. 
ᵇFirm size is calculated on the basis of the number of full-time employees. It consists of six categories, coded as 1 = 10 or fewer, 2 = 11–20, 3 = 21–50, 4 = 
51–100, 5 = 101–200, and 6 = 200 or more.  
ᶜExclusive dealing is coded as 0 = not exclusively dealing, and 1 = exclusively dealing.  
*p < .05. **p < .01.  
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Table 4. Results of the main and moderating effects tests 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Opportunistic 
Behavioral 
Intention 
Extra-role 
Behavioral 
Intention 
Opportunistic 
Behavioral 
Intention 
Extra-role 
Behavioral 
Intention 
Opportunistic 
Behavioral  
Intention 
Extra-role  
Behavioral  
Intention 
Transaction-specific investments 
(TSIs) 
.23 (1.97)* .22 (1.47) .30 (2.09)* .29 (1.90)* .36 (2.74)** .26 (1.91)* 
Out-of-the-channel-loop 
perception (OCLP) 
.48 (6.44) ** -.10 (1.59) .47 (6.14)** -.12 (1.91)* .40 (5.03)** -.03 (-.42) 
Achievement orientation (AO) -.32 (3.33)** .03 (.50) -.37 (3.52)** -.09 (1.13) -.38 (-3.89)** -.08 (-.75) 
Two-way interactions          
TSIs × OCLP     .22 (1.76)* .21 (1.82)* .28 (2.51)** .24 (2.08)* 
TSIs × AO     .01 (.14) -.16 (1.89)* .02 (.34) -.07 (-.96) 
OCLP × AO    -.20 (1.61) -.35 (2.61)** -.23 (-2.01)* -.42 (-3.69)** 
Three-way interactions          
TSIs × OCLP × AO       .15 (1.85)* -.16 (-1.88)* 
Control variables           
Strategic importance  -.11 (1.45) .38 (2.82)** -.14 (1.68)* .38 (2.83)** -.13 (-1.29) .36 (3.42)** 
Market uncertainty  .23 (2.99)** .05 (.68) .24 (2.81)** .06 (.68) .24 (3.36)** .08 (1.13) 
Firm size .03 (.82) .08 (1.39) .02 (.58) .07 (1.36) .03 (.40) .07 (1.03) 
Exclusive dealing -.03 (.77) .04 (.81) -.01 (.23) .07 (1.35) .00 (.00) .07 (1.15) 
          
R² .45 .41 .46 .47 .49 .48 
R² change    .01 .06 .03 .01 
Notes: All parameter estimates are standardized. 
**p < .01 (one-tailed test). 
*p < .05 (one-tailed test). 
 
 
 
 
